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Abstract
Chalmers is a very big name in the philosophy of consciousness and this is a very big book about
consciousness. Weighing in at over six hundred pages and comprised of fourteen, already published
papers (two of which are co-authored), it collects together Chalmers’ greatest hits on consciousness in
one handy tome. It is comprised of some highly technical and intricate philosophical papers juxtaposed
with a couple of more accessible writings that have influenced disciplines outside of philosophy. For
anyone wishing to familiarize themselves with the nuances and fine details of Chalmers’ approach (or
who lacks the full set of his papers already) the book offers excellent value for money. It provides a
window on what motivates his approach and, crucially, where his thinking is leading him now.
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Chalmers is a very big name in the philosophy of consciousness and
this is a very big book about consciousness. Weighing in at over six
hundred pages and comprised of fourteen, already published
papers (two of which are co-authored), it collects together
Chalmers’ greatest hits on consciousness in one handy tome. It is
comprised of some highly technical and intricate philosophical
papers juxtaposed with a couple of more accessible writings that
have influenced disciplines outside of philosophy. For anyone
wishing to familiarize themselves with the nuances and fine details
of Chalmers’ approach (or who lacks the full set of his papers
already) the book offers excellent value for money. It provides a
window on what motivates his approach and, crucially, where his
thinking is leading him now.
For aficionados who have been keeping a beady eye on these developments – what’s new? Apart from a sprinkling of authorial comments within the various chapters, comments that serve to
highlight links between them, there is also the book’s seventeenpage introduction. Its overview gives Chalmers’ own assessment of
how the structure of the chapters interrelate with one another; flags
up the important new ideas and proposals; and highlights the respects
in which his thinking has moved on since the publication of The
Conscious Mind.
While the book’s title might suggest that consciousness has a singular nature, Chalmers is clear that, for him, it has multifaceted characters, many interesting dimensions. Thus any attempt to understand it
requires concerted effort along multiple and inter-connected fronts.
Unavoidably, any fully convincing account of it must address questions about: (1) the problem that phenomenal consciousness poses
for standard materialism (chapter 1); (2) how it can be studied scientifically in the light of that problem (chapters 2 to 4); (3) its metaphysical nature; (4) its epistemic character and how that relates to the
nature and acquisition of phenomenal concepts (chapters 8 to 10);
(5) its intentional and representational character, and the implications
this has for how we understand the nature of the external world
(chapters 11 to 13); and (6) how it can exhibit both unity and
diversity.
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Any full inquiry into the nature of consciousness ought to have
something to say about each and all of these several dimensions – at
least. Doing justice to these topics demands separate and detailed
investigations. Still in any satisfactory overall account the conclusions
of such investigations should all hang together coherently. The aim of
providing just such a workable overall account is the rationale behind
Chalmers’ grand systematizing approach to this subject matter. Even
if one rejects the final product, one cannot fail to be impressed by the
care, attention and cunning argumentation deployed in its construction. Chalmers is thorough. He attempts to give an exhaustive and
even handed consideration to every possibility – or at least every
possibility that he takes to be a serious contender – in order to persuade the reader by cool headed argument.
This approach explains the book’s enormous size. It is also reflected in the style of the writing. While some chapters – for
example, chapter 1 – are accessible to non-analytic philosophers,
most chapters offer extraordinarily refined analyses of the topics
under investigation. These analyses will no doubt serve as key reference points for professionals working in analytic philosophy of mind.
Yet even though the positions are set out carefully, even professional
philosophers will need to invest some time and care if they are to get a
full and accurate grasp of Chalmers’ overall account and to keep track
of his particular reasons for advocating it. Most chapters make free
use of technical jargon – e.g. distinguishing between primary and secondary intensions, positive and negative conceivability – invoked in
order to make the conceptual possibilities and argumentative structure more perspicuous. While in some cases this may be necessary
and even helpful, it does not make for an easy read. For anyone unfamiliar with this style of philosophy, be warned: reading this book is
not a task for the light headed or faint hearted.
The driving insight behind Chalmers’ approach hasn’t changed;
his fundamental challenge to the field of consciousness studies is
that all standard forms of materialism are false. From the fact that
is impossible to understand or reductively explain the phenomenal
in terms of the physical broadly conceived, it follows from this that
there is more to reality than is dreamt of, or posited by, modern
day materialists or physicalists. Those who hope for explanatory or
ontological reductions using only the resources of the physical
sciences and what they pick out are out of luck. To accept that
phenomenal consciousness exists requires recognition of ‘extra ingredients’ in reality above and beyond physical properties. Those hoping
to get by with less are confronted with the hard problem of consciousness, a problem inspired by the alleged existence of an explanatory
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lacuna – the infamous explanatory gap that cannot be closed by any
account in terms of structures, functions or dynamics, no matter
how subtle, fine-grained and wide ranging the latter are. Such
phenomena are, at best, nomologically associated with experiences
of phenomenal consciousness. Thus it may be that in our world
they are related to it and required for it as a matter of natural law
but they are not logically related to it or required for it.
A great deal of this new book is devoted to explicating the nature of
the hard problem and attempting to show that there is no way to deny
or overcome it. Its opening chapter (which hails from 1995) sets the
stage. It argues that when it comes to consciousness, explanations
of the sort that can be provided by the natural sciences always and
necessarily leave untouched what most needs explaining – i.e. the
properties of what it is like to have a given experience. Phenomenal
properties are intrinsic properties of experiences – for this reason
they are systematically overlooked by, and cannot be accounted for
in terms of, or reduced to functional, structural or dynamic properties. Any attempt to explain the phenomenal aspects of experience
by appeal to properties of that sort always fall short of what is
required – such explanations can only provide more detail about
structure and dynamics – they never get at, never even mention, the
requisite phenomenal features as such. Intuitively, the problem is
illustrated by the fact that ‘for any complex macroscopic structural
or dynamical description of a system, one can conceive of that
description’s being satisfied without consciousness’ (122).
Chalmers makes an interesting admission concerning this line of
argument in the book’s introduction. He claims that this simple argument, concerning explanation, is ‘in a sense’ more fundamental than
conceivability arguments that have attracted the most philosophical
attention (xv). Without denying their important uses, nor shying
away from assessing them in great technical detail, at length (in
part III), he denies that anti-reductive arguments depend essentially
on appeal to standard philosophical thought experiments about
zombies or what Mary learns on leaving her confinement. This,
however, understates the philosophical complexities of the situation.
Appeal to explanatory considerations is no doubt more intuitively
compelling and more persuasive to those outside of or unused to philosophy. But acknowledging that an explanatory gap exists depends on
one’s background philosophical assumptions – assumptions that are
exposed and tested by reviewing one’s reactions to the thought experiments. So it is not clear in what sense the explanatory argument
could be more fundamental. Indeed, although it is to be hoped for,
it is not clear that there is any Archimedean point for fashioning
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conclusive arguments in this domain – one that all parties can agree
upon, that doesn’t beg any crucial questions. For more on
Chalmers’ response to this, see his revealing discussion on pages
33–34.
Some, for example, do not accept Chalmers’ framing assumption.
This is the most obdurate response to the hard problem – that of Type
A materialists. They deny the existence of any epistemic, metaphysical or explanatory gap. Phenomenal zombies are inconceivable and,
even locked in her black and white room, there is nothing that Mary
doesn’t know about what it is like to experience redness. Although
this needn’t seem obvious, a wholly third person approach – one
that may involve complete knowledge of a correct physics – provides
all that is required for understanding the phenomenal. Put this way,
Type C materialism collapses into Type A materialism (as Chalmers
himself argues). Type Cers hold that phenomenal zombies only seem
conceivable to us because of our current state knowledge, they are not
conceivable ‘in the limit’. Type C types are really Type A types who
add a ‘the cheque is in the post’ rider to their account.
By far the most popular response to Chalmers’ challenge has been
to adopt some sort of Type B materialism – to accept that there is an
epistemic and explanatory gap while denying the existence of an
ontological gap. Phenomenal zombies are conceivable, but this is
put down to peculiar features of phenomenal concepts; nothing interesting follows from the fact that we conceive such monsters about the
metaphysics of consciousness. This is to opt for a non-explanatory
physicalism. As a result, for Type Bers, the link between the physical
and the phenomenal is thought to be ‘epistemically primitive’; one
cannot deduce phenomenal truths a priori from known physical
truths. That doesn’t preclude physical facts being all the facts. The
phenomenal might just be the physical differently described –
under a different, irreducible, guise or mode of presentation. One
might hold this while postulating identities, as Papineau does, and
arguing that there is no need to explain them. Does it make sense,
after all, to ask why Clark Kent is Superman?
No doubt due to its popularity, the book focuses mostly on undermining this sort of approach, providing a range of extensive and detailed arguments against its viability. For one thing, it is complained
that an appeal to unexplained identities won’t do since identities in
other domains can be deduced from more basic truths (see 117).
Other arguments, based on Chalmers’ own, controversial, twodimensional semantic framework, are also brought to bear to show
that there is no way to avoid the link from ideal conceivability to
metaphysical possibility (see chapter 6 and appendix). Even more
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powerfully, building on his analysis of the nature and formation of
phenomenal concepts (chapter 8), and the implications this has for
epistemology (chapter 9), Chalmers advances his master argument
against Type B materialists who invoke the phenomenal concept
strategy (chapter 10). The dilemma he poses is, crudely but essentially, that Type Bers must either assume that it is (a) possible to
explain why there are phenomenal concepts that generate the explanatory gap, given our makeup, in physical, non-phenomenal terms
or (b) it is not. If they assume (a), their position collapses into
Type A materialism. If they assume (b), they lack a means of explaining the epistemic gap in tune with physicalism. Either way the
phenomenal concept strategy affords no escape from the hard
problem.
Chalmers concludes that the only live options for responding to the
hard problem are adoption of some form of Type D interactive
dualism, Type E epiphenomenal dualism, or Type F Russellian
neutral monism. In the introduction he confesses to having less sympathy for epiphenomenalism than he once did. Having myself promoted the fortunes of a non-Russellian monism, one that has closer
affinities to Bradley’s Absolute Idealism, I find Chalmers’ final
score sheet encouraging. A non-physicalist monist can allow that
phenomenal experiences admit of true physical descriptions,
without assuming that such descriptions exhaust or fully characterize
all aspects of their nature. Experiences can be enjoyed and truly described in ways that do not invoke the vocabulary of physics. When
events are enjoyed or described in those different ways, different features are highlighted. There is no ultimately privileged way for describing experiences that captures all of their essential properties.
However perfect physical science may become its descriptions and
explanations will always be as conceptually limited and interest-sensitive as any other. Even ideal physical descriptions do not provide a
transparent window into every essential aspect of what they pick out
in extension. Chalmers flirts with a similar sentiment, accepting that
‘perception and even science do not reveal the entire intrinsic character of the world’ (xxvi). However, in chapter 13, which he regards as
his favourite, he develops this thought in an un-idealist way, by advancing the matrix hypothesis in the form of a metaphysical
hypothesis.
Taking any one of these routes, by themselves, does nothing positive to clear the air of the explanatory mystery associated with the
hard problem – where this is understood as requiring an intelligible
explanation of how the relation between the phenomenal and the
physical. Still Chalmers hopes to provide a positive proposal to
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address it by advancing a different sort of science of consciousness.
He envisions a science of consciousness that is essentially correlative
rather than reductive. Yet, while he recognizes that robust scientific
research into consciousness has blossomed during the past sixteen
years, he confesses to only limited progress on finding bridging principles to link first and third personal phenomena – as he construes
them. Nevertheless, ‘if one squints one can discern the possibility
of framework on the far horizon’ (xvii).
It is arguable that a problem with Chalmers’ way of understanding
the nature of a future science of consciousness is that in seeking bridging laws it is too closely associated with assumptions of naturalistic
dualism as opposed to some variant of monism. On some variants of
the Type F monistic reply there simply is no relation here that needs
explaining. From this perspective solving the hard problem isn’t just
hard – it is impossible. The articulation of the hard problem
serves the important function of exposing flaws in materialist
thinking. It shows that we need to rethink the nature of phenomenal
consciousness, in a quite fundamental way. Nevertheless, it is to
exercise practical wisdom to avoid trying to give a straight solution
to it. This is not to cop out. It’s a waste of time to try to solve
problems that cannot be solved. The really hard problem is getting
certain philosophers to see the hard problem is an impossible
problem.
What of other aspects of Chalmers’ positive project? He holds that
intentionality and consciousness are ‘intimately connected’; they are
‘intertwined all the way down to the ground’ (371). As such any
satisfactory accounts of these – the most important phenomena of
mind – must speak to another. In a bid to provide such an account,
Chalmers sets out the stall for an unusual sort of representationalism
about phenomenal properties – defending a nonreductive, impure,
narrow, Fregean version of representationalism (341). Unsurprisingly,
given his arguments against reductionism, he bucks the trend of
seeking to understand phenomenal properties in terms of representational properties, allying himself more closely with those that
hold there are at least some important kinds of representational
properties that might be grounded in phenomenal properties.
He defends the view that experiences have phenomenal content –
that they represent the world as being a certain way – a way that is
assessable for accuracy; thus they have a specific kind of representational content with built-in conditions of satisfaction. This, he
admits, is a ‘substantive thesis’ (383), but it is one – he thinks –
there is good reason to accept. In his view experiences enjoy a
veritable smorgasbord of content – there is Russellian, Fregean and
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Edenic content. As he presents things, such pluralism looks unproblematic because he characterizes Russellian contents as extensions and
Fregean contents – modes of presentation – are conditions on
extensions. Ultimately, due to problems with Russellian representationalism he defends the view that phenomenal representational
content is a kind of Fregean content – a mode of presentation with a
content captured by something like the following condition of satisfaction: the object or property that normally causes experiences of
such and such a phenomenal type. Yet he recognizes that Fregean
modes of presentation, so defined, lack phenomenological adequacy
and threaten to overintellectualize the phenomenal contents of experience (a concern that lingers even if he can defend the idea that such
contents are nonconceptual, as is his wont – see pages 368–9).
In response, he posits yet another kind of content – Edenic content –
to help refine and supplement his account of Fregean content. Edenic
content is how things appear to us phenomenologically – how they
would have to be if our experiences were to be perfectly veridical.
But on the assumption that we don’t live in Eden, there is a gap
between how things seem and how they are. To use Chalmers’
example – we can, and often do, experience perfect redness even
though our world at best instantiates imperfect redness – where the
latter might be some physical property, such as surface spectral
reflectance.
Does this mean our phenomenal Edenic content always and systematically misrepresents? Chalmers denies this. For he holds that
imperfect redness will match perfect redness if it plays the role that
perfect redness would have played in Eden – i.e. that of bringing
about phenomenally red experiences. With the less stringent notion
of imperfect redness and the notion of matching in play, Chalmers
aims to secure the idea that our representations are often veridical
in an ordinary sense. We can accept this if we are not overly demanding about what veridicality requires – that is, if we require less than
what would be required for veridicality in Eden. With this apparatus
in play, the Fregean conditions of satisfaction can be formulated in a
revised way to capture what is represented by phenomenal contents.
For example, ‘a phenomenally red experience will be imperfectly veridical iff its object has the property that normally causes phenomenally red experiences’ (403). This representational content is plausibly
often satisfied, even in our imperfect world. Thus ‘Our experience
presents an Edenic world and thereby represents an ordinary
world’ (406). Since the ordinary Fregean and Russellian content of
experiences are derived from Edenic content, it turns out that
‘Edenic content is that key’ (454).
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This account is ultimately not very satisfying. For Chalmers, ‘It
seems intuitively clear that perceptual phenomenology, by its very
nature, involves representation of the external world’ (344). In line
with this intuition, he holds it is ‘not implausible that there is something about consciousness that by its very nature yields representation of the world’ (371). Yet claiming that phenomenality and
representation are linked in very basic and internal ways does
nothing to help us understand how experiential states of mind
could possibly make inherent contentful demands on the world.
It is not at all clear how simply enjoying a certain qualitative
experience – say, the redness of red – could suffice to represent the
world as being a certain way, where this entails its having a kind of
content that makes a claim on reality. It is not clear how qualitative
experiences – by themselves – could ‘attribute’ certain properties to
reality or state which conditions the world would be required to
satisfy if one’s experience were to be accurate or veridical – not
even in the ordinary sense.
A more robust account than Chalmers offers is required if we are to
make intelligible how experiences might intrinsically possess such
properly contentful properties. Chalmers offers no such explanation,
nor does he pretend to. While this is wholly in line with his promotion of non-reductionism, in the end the lack of explanatory
power makes his account more questionable, not more attractive.
This is revealed, for example, when he asks, rhetorically, how
mental states come by Edenic content, given its pivotal importance
in his account. Disappointingly but tellingly, he declines to answer,
noting only that, ‘We do not yet have a good theory of how mental
states represent properties at all’ (418).
That is surely true. All existing attempts to explain content as naturally occurring, purely physical, information processing or bio-functional phenomena have proved inadequate. Indeed, there are
excellent reasons to suspect that mental content is logically distinct
from, and irreducible to, properties, relations and functions identified by the natural sciences. A plausible diagnosis of the source of
these failures suggests that there is a hard problem of content – one
that is no less serious than the hard problem of consciousness. But,
if so, perhaps rather than sticking with certain fashionable intuitions
about the representational nature of perceptual experience, and
building elaborate and intricate, but ultimately non-explanatory frameworks to accommodate such intuitions, we might also revisit standard thinking about these topics too. For all that Chalmers offers us
his magnificent, mammoth and challenging tour de force, there are
many conservative strands in his thought that warrant serious
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challenge. The first step is to get to know his arguments in detail –
and there is no better place to start than with this book.
Daniel D. Hutto
d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk
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Plato spoke of love in terms of vision, and Jollimore grants also that
love can involve a truthful vision of reality, though he rejects
Plato’s inference that our vision is blinkered if love remains fixated
on human beings. Jollimore is concerned exclusively with love for
and between persons, and the love in question comprises erotic love
and friendship. These loves, he says, ‘can be treated by a single
account’ (xiv), and this ‘friend/lover model’ is most relevant to love
between human beings. Agape is excluded because it is doubtful
whether we are capable of feeling it (xiii).
Love is a vision in the sense that it involves ‘an appreciative attention directed towards the beloved’s positive qualities’ (7). The claim
contravenes the common refrain that love is blind, a refrain which
tends to go hand in hand with the idea that the lover invents rather
than discovers the qualities she finds in her beloved. Jollimore
allows that some beloveds bear no resemblance to their lover’s
image of them, but resists the assumption that such pathological
cases are paradigmatic. So genuine love is not blind in this sense,
but it might be thought nonetheless to involve misperception and delusion about the value of the beloved’s qualities – everything about
her becomes wonderful, even her toothmarks on a pencil (8).
Hence the suspicion that love is fundamentally irrational.
Jollimore resists this conclusion and argues that love can be justified by reasons, the most powerful sources of reasons being ‘the attractive and otherwise valuable properties of the beloved’ (13). He
is quick to point out, however, that awareness of such properties
does not rationally obligate the lover, or anyone else for that matter,
to fall in love with their possessor: ‘no list of attractive or otherwise
valuable features of B is such that a person cannot admit that B possesses all of those features and yet fail to love B without being
irrational’ (14). Likewise, there is no requirement that the lover fall
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